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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most prominent instances of an unregulated custody transfer 
within the United States involved Arkansas state representative Justin Harris. 
Harris and his wife began the adoption process of three young girls in 2012, 
finalizing the adoption of two of them in March 2013.1  The Harrises soon 
decided that the girls were violent and that this violence jeopardized the 
safety of the couple’s biological sons.2  Despite this, the couple said they 
were fearful of involving the Arkansas Department of Human Services 
because doing so might lead to charges of abandonment that could affect the 
custody of their biological children.3  In October 2013, the girls were given 
to an employee who had worked at a daycare run by the Harrises, and by 
March of 2014 it was discovered that one of the girls had been sexually 
assaulted by the man into whose custody they had been placed.4  That man, 
Eric Francis, is now serving a forty-year sentence for the sexual assault, as 
well as for two additional incidents of sexual assault involving other 
children.5  There was no government oversight or involvement at any point 
in the transfer of the girls from the Harrises to Francis.6  
On April 6, 2015, Arkansas responded by enacting legislation7 that was 
designed to combat the practice of unregulated custody transfers within the 
state.8  Despite this legislation, the Harrises have not faced criminal or civil 
liability for their part in the unregulated custody transfer of their two adopted 
daughters, as their actions were legal prior to the passing of the rehoming 
legislation.9  The outrage generated when the unregulated custody transfer first 
came to light was also insufficient to oust Justin Harris from public office.10  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Benjamin Hardy, Months After the Rehoming of Their Adopted Daughters Was Made 
Public, Justin and Marsha Harris Have Yet to Face Consequences, ARK. TIMES (May 28, 2015), 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/months-after-the-rehoming-of-their-adopted-daugh ters-was-
made-public-justin-and-marsha-harris-have-yet-to-face-consequences/Content?oid=3871740.  
One of the girls was returned to the Arkansas Department of Human Services prior to the 
finalization of the adoption due to difficulties stemming from the girl’s behavioral issues.   
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.  
 7 H.B. 1676, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/asse 
mbly/2015/2015R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1676 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
 8 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-211(b) (West 2016). 
 9 See Hardy, supra note 1.  
 10 See Legislator List, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembl 
y/2015/2015R/Pages/LegislatorSearchResults.aspx?member=&committee=All&chamber= (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2016) (listing Justin Harris as the representative of the eighty-first district).  
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The sexual assault and unregulated custody transfer went undetected until 
an anonymous phone call to Arkansas’ child maltreatment hotline led to the 
discovery of the unregulated transfer and subsequent abuse.11  Because no 
oversight was mandated, there was no requirement that Francis receive the 
type of background checks and home studies12 that are standard in adoption 
proceedings.13  Those precautions are designed to ensure that the best 
interests of children are protected.  Absent government intervention or 
management of custody transfers, the girls in the Harris case were exposed to 
risks that might otherwise have been avoided. 
“Unregulated custody transfers” involve the permanent transfer of 
custody of an adopted child to a third party, often using a legal device like a 
power of attorney in order to give the third-party legal control of the child.  
The third-parties in these transfers can be anyone, regardless of their 
qualification or previous history with children, and because there is no 
government oversight or notice of such transfers the children are potentially 
exposed to substantial harm.14  Information regarding the frequency of these 
transfers is scarce, but evidence suggests that the problem affects children 
adopted internationally more regularly than children adopted domestically.  
This Note argues that the United States is not currently committed to 
actively combating the practice of unregulated custody transfers based on its 
existing international obligations.  This Note arrives at that conclusion by 
exploring the international instruments that might currently bind the United 
States to take proactive steps to prevent the practice, thereby safeguarding 
the best interests of children adopted internationally.  
Part I will explore the problem of unregulated custody transfers, including 
instances where such transfers have exposed the involved children to harm. 
This Note will then briefly examine the current legal framework within the 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Benjamin Hardy, A Child Left Unprotected, ARK. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.arkti 
mes.com/arkansas/a-child-left-unprotected/Content?oid=3691164. 
 12 Home studies are investigations into the home of prospective adoptive parents that are 
designed “to ensure that each child is placed in a suitable home and that good matches are 
made between children and families.” Home Studies, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/adoption/adoptive/home-study/ (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2016); see also U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-733, CHILD WELFARE: 
STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ADDRESS UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS OF ADOPTED 
CHILDREN (2015) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“[A] home study [is] performed by a licensed 
professional to assess the suitability of the prospective parents, such as their health, finances, 
and criminal history.”).   
 13 See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 6–7 (discussing many of the checks adoptive parents 
must go through when seeking to adopt a child).  
 14 This practice is commonly referred to as “rehoming,” after the analogous practice of 
finding a new home for a problematic pet.  However, equating children with animals makes 
the “unregulated custody transfer” terminology preferable. 
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United States.  Part II will examine the current standing of international law 
that is most directly relevant to the problem, focusing on instruments 
concerning children’s rights, illegal adoption, and human trafficking to which 
the United States is, at least arguably, bound, and will end with a discussion of 
the child’s “best interests standard” within international law.  Part III begins by 
analyzing whether the child’s best interests standard as understood by the 
international community is applicable to the United States and will conclude 
that the United States arguably has committed itself to safeguarding the best 
interests of children.  Despite the foregoing, this Note will argue that the open-
ended nature of the best interests standard makes it difficult to say that the 
United States must take any particular course of action to combat the practice 
of unregulated custody transfers.  Further, even if the United States is obligated 
to act, it is unclear what such action would look like, and whether it would be 
any different than the current approach which leaves the regulation of family 
matters up to each constituent U.S. state.  Part III then compares unregulated 
custody transfers to illegal adoptions and human trafficking and argues that the 
substantive elements of both practices, as currently understood within 
international law, are manifested through such transfers.  Despite the 
similarities, however, the present understanding of what constitutes illegal 
adoption and human trafficking in the international community makes it 
unlikely that such transfers are covered under international law.  This Note 
argues that the definitions of both illegal adoption and human trafficking 
should be explicitly expanded to include unregulated custody transfers, insofar 
as the practice effectively satisfies the elements of both illegal activities.  
Finally, this Note will briefly examine potential strategies for dealing with 
unregulated custody transfers, focusing on ways to decrease the number of 
transfers that occur and to increase the likelihood of intervention when they do.  
II.  THE PROBLEM OF UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS 
The practice of “unregulated custody transfers,” popularly known as “re-
homing,” came to the public’s attention in the United States in late 2013, 
following the publication of an exposé examining the practice.15  
                                                                                                                   
 15 See Megan Twohey, The Child Exchange: The Network, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2013), http:// 
www.reuters.com/investigates/adoption/#article/part1. This seminal piece on unregulated 
custody transfers—a 2014 finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting—focused 
on internet messaging boards that were being used as virtual meeting places/exchanges.  2014 
Pulitzer Prize Winners & Finalists, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/prize-
winners-by-year/2014 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).  The article found that one Yahoo message 
board (now closed) had 261 children offered for unregulated custody transfers over a five-year 
period, yielding an average of about one child per week.  Of these 261 children, at least 70% 
were born overseas.  
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Unregulated custody transfers involve the transfer of custody of an adopted 
child to a third party by an adoptive parent, often via the use of a power of 
attorney.16  There is no government oversight or notification of the custody 
transfer, which means there are no official means by which the best interests 
of the child or children17 are protected.18  Until very recently, these transfers 
were technically legal in every constituent state of the United States, and 
they remain so in the vast majority of those constituent states.19  
As indicated above, significant obstacles make combating this practice 
difficult.  First, U.S. states are generally left to combat the practice 
individually, and what interstate coordination exists that might be brought to 
bear on the problem of unregulated custody transfers is inadequate.20  
Second, despite some federal interest on the topic,21 no new legislation has 
been proposed to address the issue at a national level.  This inconsistent 
attention leaves adopted children—and particularly internationally adopted 
children—vulnerable to the potential harms inherent in the practice.22  These 
harms are not merely theoretical: there are documented instances where 
children were left with people who were later convicted for possession of 
child pornography or were accused of sleeping naked in the same bed as a 
child acquired through one of these transfers.23   
                                                                                                                   
 16 Twohey, supra note 15. 
 17 The “best interests of the child” is a legal term of art used to describe the standard by 
which decisions concerning a child are to be judged in both the public and private spheres.  
This standard is enshrined within the international community in Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  See G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 4, ¶ 1, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Child Rights Convention].  The 
official comments on Article 3 describe the best interests of the child as a substantive right, an 
interpretive legal principle, and a rule of procedure.  See Comm. on the Rights of the Children, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14, at 3–4 (May 29, 2013).  The comments to Article 3 include a non-
exhaustive list of factors, relevant to a best interests of the child analysis, centered around 
protecting and advancing the overall well-being of the child. See generally id.  
 18 See Twohey, supra note 15.  
 19 See infra Part II.A for a more detailed discussion of the status of unregulated custody 
transfer legislation within the United States.  The United States has a federal system of 
government wherein each of the constituent states is a sovereign power with legislative 
authority.  Although the federal government is empowered to legislate in some areas, the 
individual constituent states are primarily responsible for the creation and enforcement of 
criminal legislation within their respective jurisdictions.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).    
 20 See infra note 61, for a discussion of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.  
 21 See GAO REPORT, supra note 12 (discussing the scope of the practice at a national level 
and displaying a variety of approaches to tackling the problem).  
 22 See Twohey, supra note 15.  
 23 Id.  
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The legislative responses to the issue of unregulated transfers within the 
United States have not demonstrated movement towards a unified, 
nationwide solution to the problem.  Relatively few U.S. states have existing 
legislation aimed at combating the practice, and few of those states laws do 
more than impose limits on the time during which custody can be transferred 
to a non-relative third party through use of a power of attorney.24  What 
momentum there was at the federal level appears to have faltered, and there 
has been no official congressional action since the Government 
Accountability Office published a report in 2015, at Congress’s request, on 
the topic of unregulated custody transfers.25  
The focus on the United States is not misplaced, given its prominence in 
international adoption.  By sheer numbers, the United States is the world’s 
leading “receiving” country (a country that is the recipient of adopted 
children),26 taking in nearly half of all children adopted internationally from 
2004 to 2015.27  Because the United States receives such a large proportion 
of internationally adopted children, the status of unregulated custody 
transfers within the current understanding of the international law—
particularly the international legal framework around illegal adoption and 
human trafficking—is relevant worldwide.   
A.  Background 
Evidence suggests that older children adopted internationally are more 
likely to be the subject of an unregulated custody transfer, though little data 
on the actual shape and scope of the problem exist due to the underground 
nature of the practice.28  Even though any given child is a potential victim of 
                                                                                                                   
 24 See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion of U.S. law on a state-by-state basis.  
 25 See GAO REPORT, supra note 12.  Despite the initial interest at the federal level, a survey 
of current federal legislation did not uncover any statutes that target the practice of 
unregulated custody transfers.  
 26 In international adoption, the “receiving country” is the country which will receive the 
adopted child.  In contrast, the “sending country” is the country from which a child will be 
adopted.  Developed nations tend to be receiving countries, while poorer developing countries 
tend to be sending countries.  See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption, in CHILDREN 
AND YOUTH IN ADOPTION, ORPHANAGES, AND FOSTER CARE 63, 66 (Lori Askeland ed., 2006). 
 27 From 2004 to 2015, the United States adopted 165,504 children internationally, while the 
remaining twenty-three responding countries adopted 178,364 children internationally.  See 
Peter Selman, Global Statistics for Intercountry Adoption: Receiving States and States of 
Origin 2004–2015, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017), https:// 
assets.hcch.net/docs/a8fe9f19-23e6-40c2-855e-388e112bf1f5.pdf.  
 28 See Twohey, supra note 15 (observing that the majority of children advertised on internet 
messaging boards for the purpose of transferring custody ranged in age from six to fourteen 
years old); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 4 (“[R]eports of unregulated transfers 
have primarily pertained to children adopted internationally or from foster care); id. at 13–14 
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the practice, many children adopted overseas are more prone to victimization 
because they come from institutionalized settings which have been linked to 
behavioral, emotional, or developmental problems.29  This presents unique 
challenges with which adoptive parents may struggle to cope, thereby 
threatening to disrupt or dissolve the adoption.30  It can also be more difficult 
to get accurate child histories, and adoptive parents may not be prepared to 
handle any undisclosed or undiagnosed behavioral, mental, or emotional 
problems with which a child may be struggling.31  
According to the U.S. Department of State, no federal requirements 
mandate post-adoption reviews or reports, though a country of origin—i.e., 
the country where the child is from—may require periodic reports within a 
specified timeframe following an international adoption of a child.32  Further, 
the post-adoption help available to struggling adoptive parents from the 
government or the adoption agency with whom they worked is often limited 
or non-existent.33  It is also practically impossible to break the legally-created 
parent-child relationship or accomplish involuntary termination of parental 
rights without judicial intervention.34  In fact, there are no state-sanctioned or 
formal means by which an adoptive parent in the United States can end his or 
her parental relationship with a child following the finalization of an 
adoption decree.35  Without adequate resources and a state-sanctioned way to 
dissolve a fatally troubled adoption, parents are left in limbo.  Parents are not 
                                                                                                                   
(noting that under 8% of children adopted internationally in 2013 were younger than one year 
old, and that a 2013 study found that almost half of adoptive parents surveyed said that their 
internationally adopted children had diagnosed special needs).  
 29 See Dana E. Johnson, Know the Risks: Adopting an Institutionalized Child, ADOPTIVE 
FAMILIES ASSOCIATION OF BC, https://www.bcadoption.com/resources/articles/know-risks-
adopting-institutionalized-child (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (discussing the types of mental 
and physical issues associated with the adoption of post-institutionalized children); see also 
RUTH LYN MEESE, CHILDREN OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS IN SCHOOL: A PRIMER FOR 
PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 4–17 (2002) (discussing pre-adoption care of adopted children 
from several prominent sending countries, and the connection between institutionalization and 
the health and developmental difficulties it causes children).   
 30 GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5 (“[A]n adoption may be terminated as a result of 
disruption, which occurs before the adoption is finalized, or a dissolution, which occurs after 
the adoption is finalized.”); MEESE, supra note 29, at 4–17.  
 31 Twohey, supra note 15; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.    
 32 GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.  
 33 Id. at 20–24.  
 34 Andrea B. Carroll, Breaking Forever Families, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 259, 260 n.7 (2015) 
(citing Tiffany Woo, Comment, When the Forever Family Isn’t: Why State Laws Allowing 
Adoptive Parents to Voluntarily Rescind an Adoption Violate the Adopted Child’s Equal 
Protection Rights, 39 SW. L. REV. 569, 571–72 (2010)) (highlighting how rare it has 
historically been for courts to set aside finalized adoption decrees). 
 35 Id. at 260–61. 
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only unable to maintain their custodial relationship with the child, but they 
also lack a legally-sanctioned way of permanently relinquishing that custody.   
B.  Unregulated Custody Transfers as a “Solution” 
Unregulated custody transfers offer a way out of an adoption—a way that 
avoids the potential legal consequences of a finding of abuse or neglect, and 
one of the only possible means by which adoptive parents in the United 
States can relinquish custody of a child.  A common mechanism for 
effectuating these transfers is the use of a power of attorney, “a notarized 
statement declaring the child to be in the care of another adult.”36  A power 
of attorney acts as a legal loop-hole of sorts.  Although parents cannot legally 
divest themselves of their parental rights and obligations through use of a 
power of attorney, they can practically achieve the same effect by enabling a 
caretaker to make major decisions regarding a child.37  Normally, the ability 
to use a power of attorney to transfer temporary custody of a child can be 
advantageous.  For example, parents deployed overseas can confer on a 
friend or relative the power of attorney to temporarily transfer custody of a 
child, thereby protecting the best interests and welfare of the child without 
requiring government intervention.38  However, this same tool can be and has 
been used as a way of establishing a permanent custodial relationship 
without going through state-sanctioned processes designed to safeguard the 
best interests of the child.39  When joined with the ability to find new homes 
for children via the internet with virtual anonymity and privacy, the use of a 
power of attorney offers parents a way out of an adoption unavailable 
through traditional legal channels.  
C.  Relevant Legislation at the Level of the Constituent States of the United 
States 
There is no law directly concerning the unregulated custody transfer of 
adopted children at the federal level of the United States, despite interest in 
the subject as evidenced by the report issued by the Government 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Twohey, supra note 15.  
 37 See O.C.G.A. § 19-9-123 (Westlaw current through the 2017 Session of the Georgia 
General Assembly) for an example of the broad authority that can be granted via a power of 
attorney.   
 38 Id. (laying out the authority of an agent authorized to care for a child using a power of 
attorney).   
 39 See generally Twohey, supra note 15 (describing how a power of attorney can be used to 
create a de facto custodial relationship between an agent and a child).  
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Accountability Office in 2015.40  However, legislatures of the constituent 
states of the United States began to respond to the problem of unregulated 
custody transfers in 2014.41  To date, twelve of those states have legislation 
that targets some aspect of unregulated custody transfers.  Eight states—
Arkansas,42 Colorado,43 Florida,44 Kentucky,45 Louisiana,46 Maine,47 
Missouri,48 and Nevada49—have passed laws making it a felony to engage in 
unregulated custody transfers.  New Hampshire,50 North Dakota,51 Rhode 
Island,52 and Wisconsin53 also have laws targeting these custody transfers, 
but the penalties proscribed are misdemeanors.54   
Of the twelve U.S. states that have passed legislation that targets some 
aspect of unregulated custody transfers, few have targeted the various ways 
such transfers are effectuated.  For example, Florida’s relevant statute 
prohibits the use of any public media to advertise either that a child is 
                                                                                                                   
 40 See GAO REPORT, supra note 12.  
 41 Wisconsin was the first U.S. state to target the practice with the passing of legislation in 
2014.  Barnini Chakraborty, Wisconsin Becomes First State to Restrict Parents from Giving 
Up Adopted Kids, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/18/ 
wisconsin-becomes-first-state-to-ban-advertising-adopted-kids-online.html.  
 42 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-211(b) (Westlaw through the 2017 legislative sessions) 
(effective July 22, 2015). 
 43 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-213.5 (Westlaw through August 8, 2017) (effective July 1, 2014).  
 44 FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(g) (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and Special 
“A” Session) (effective July 1, 2014). 
 45 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.352 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Regular Session) 
(effective July 15, 2016). 
 46 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.4 (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Extraordinary Session) 
(effective Aug. 1, 2016). 
 47 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-104 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session) 
(amended 2017) (effective Jan. 1, 2017).  
 48 MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and First 
and Second Extraordinary Sessions). 
 49 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.240 (Westlaw current through the 79th Regular Session 
(2017)). 
 50 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:33 (Westlaw through the 2017 Regular Session). 
 51 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-05 (Westlaw through 2017 Regular Session). 
 52 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72.1-4(d) (Westlaw through Chapter 302 of the January 2017 
Session). 
 53 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.979 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 57) (effective Apr. 27, 2016). 
 54 Going further, the average period of incarceration across those twelve states is thirty-four 
months, and the range is anywhere from six months (Rhode Island) to sixty months 
(Louisiana).  Similarly, the average fine for those states is $14,966.67, and the range extends 
from $500 (Rhode Island) to $100,000 (Colorado).  The applicability of the laws also varies, 
with some states (e.g., Arkansas) only focusing on unregulated custody transfers involving 
adopted children, while other states (e.g., Louisiana) do not specify that a child must have 
been adopted for the legislation to be applicable. 
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available for adoption or that a child is sought for adoption.55  Missouri, on 
the other hand, prohibits the transfer of custody of a child without first 
obtaining a court order approving or ordering the transfer.56  And North 
Dakota prevents anyone other than a child’s parents from assuming the 
permanent care and custody of a child—with the exception of placements 
with a grandparent, uncle, or aunt—for the purposes of establishing a 
permanent custodial relationship.57  Finally, Kentucky,58 Maine,59 and 
Wisconsin60 only go so far as to prevent the use of a power of attorney to 
transfer parental rights and responsibilities for more than one year.  
Several obstacles make combating the practice at the level of the 
constituent states of the United States difficult.  First, U.S. states are 
generally left to combat the practice individually, and what interstate 
coordination exists that might be relevant to stopping unregulated custody 
transfers is inadequate.61  Second, despite some federal interest in the topic,62 
no new legislation has been proposed to address the issue of unregulated 
custody transfers at the national level.  
                                                                                                                   
 55 FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(g) (Westlaw current through the 2017 First Regular Session and 
Special “A” Session of the 25th Legislature). 
 56 MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and First 
and Second Extraordinary Sessions). 
 57 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-05 (Westlaw through 2017 Regular Session). 
 58 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.352 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Regular Session).  
 59 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-104 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session) 
(amended 2017). 
 60 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.979 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 57).  
 61 Every constituent state within the United States is a member of the Interstate Compact on 
the Placement of Children (ICPC), a binding contract between those states designed to 
facilitate custody transfers of children across state borders through the establishment of 
uniform procedures and policies.  Those states have each enacted the text of the Compact; 
therefore, it is not federal legislation, despite its national scope.  See ASS’N OF ADMINS. OF THE 
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILD., http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/ 
en/home.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).  This Compact is not necessarily responsive to the 
issue of unregulated custody transfers, however, because it only applies to custody transfers of 
children between U.S. states when the child is in the custody of one of those states or when 
the child is being moved pursuant to a formal adoption or foster placement.  As such, the 
ICPC is powerless to stop the use of a power of attorney to effectuate a permanent custody 
transfer, nor can it mandate oversight by the designated state agency responsible for 
overseeing such transfers.  Since neither of the triggering conditions are satisfied, the Compact 
cannot be brought to bear on one of the common ways custody of children is given to new 
caretakers in an unregulated custody transfer.  See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 39-4-4, art. III (Westlaw 
current through the 2017 Session of the Georgia General Assembly) (incorporating the ICPC 
into the Georgia state legislative code).  Further, the Compact is dependent on state laws when 
an illegal placement has occurred, so it has no independent ability to enforce its provisions. 
See, e.g., id. art. IV.  
 62 See GAO REPORT, supra note 12 (discussing the scope of the practice of unregulated 
custody transfers at a national level and recommending possible solutions to this problem).  
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III.  STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING, AND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
Intercountry adoption entails the change in an “adopted child’s habitual 
country of residence but not necessarily of the child’s citizenship.”63  The 
United Nations estimated in 2005 that around 40,000 international adoptions 
took place each year, accounting for 15% of all adoptions (both intra- and 
intercountry) worldwide.64  The United States is the world’s leading 
receiving country, but the United States adopts internationally at a lower rate 
than many other receiving countries as a percentage of its overall number of 
adoptions (both international and domestic).65 
Because of their focus on adoption, human trafficking, or the concept of 
the best interests of the child, several international instruments discussed in 
this section can be roughly categorized as applicable to unregulated custody 
transfers.  This Note will focus primarily on widely applicable international 
law, rather than bilateral or small multilateral instruments.  It does so for two 
reasons: first, international adoption involves many countries, and as such 
the widest possible applications will be the most useful to combating 
practices that harm those adoptive children; second, the United States is the 
largest receiving country with respect to international adoptions.66  Since the 
problem of unregulated custody transfers involves the “giving away” of 
children who were received by the adopted parents, focusing narrowly on the 
United States is an efficient way to combat the practice with respect to the 
largest population of children adopted internationally.   
A.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Child Rights 
Convention) was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989 and entered into 
                                                                                                                   
 63 See Child Adoption: Trends and Policies, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/292, U.N. Sales No. E.10.XIII.4, at 74 (2009), http://www.un.org/esa/popula 
tion/publications/adoption2010/child_adoption.pdf. 
 64 Id.   
 65 Id. at 75.  Table V.3 cites the percentage of international adoptions in the United States at 
15%, while other receiving countries adopt internationally at a considerably higher rate.  See, 
e.g., France at 90%, Spain at 82%, Italy at 68%, Sweden at 65%, Norway at 76%, and 
Belgium at 95%.  Of the twenty-seven countries listed, only the United Kingdom (5%) and 
Portugal (1%) adopted internationally at a rate lower than that of the United States.  The 
median rate for international adoption is 64% of all adoptions.    
 66 Selman, supra note 27.  
2017] UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS 197 
 
force in 1990.67  The Child Rights Convention was created because the 
international community determined that the existing human rights 
conventions and treaties did not adequately address the unique needs of 
children,68 and that proactive measures should be taken to protect the rights 
of children given children’s comparatively vulnerable status relative to 
adults.69  The Child Rights Convention is binding on states parties rather than 
individual persons, per the language of that Convention, meaning that states 
parties are the entities responsible for protecting the rights set forth in that 
instrument.70   
As of 2016, the United States is the only member of the United Nations 
that has not ratified the Child Rights Convention, though it is a signatory.71  
The United States was also an active participant over the ten-year process 
during which the Child Rights Convention was drafted.72  Despite this, the 
Child Rights Convention has never been submitted to the Senate for 
ratification, as required by the U.S. Constitution.73  This may reflect a 
general wariness of international treaties—which might undermine the 
sovereignty of the United States—as well as political opposition within the 
United States.74  This opposition asserts that committing to that Convention 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17.   
 68 See Iara de Witte, Illegal Adoption as Child Trafficking: The Potential of the EU Anti-
trafficking Directive in Protecting Children and Their Original Family from Abusive 
Intercountry Adoption 8 (May 2012) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Amsterdam) 
(discussing the reasons motivating the creation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child).  
 69 Id.; see also Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, at Preamble. 
 70 See, e.g., Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 6 (“1. States Parties recognize that 
every child has the inherent right to life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child.” (emphasis added)); see also id. art. 7(2) 
(“States Parties shall ensure . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. art. 9(1) (“States Parties shall 
ensure . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 71 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the Commissioner, Status of Ratification 
Interactive Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org (select “Convention on the Rights of the 
Child” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown box at the top of the page). 
 72 Susan Kilbourne, Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: Responses to Parental Rights Arguments, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 55, 
55–56 (1998). 
 73 Id. at 56; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 74 Kilbourne, supra note 72, at 57; see also Martha Middleton, The Last Holdout: The ABA 
Adds its Voice to Calls for the United States to Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 102-MAR A.B.A. J. 64, 66 (2016) (discussing several reasons why the Child Rights 
Convention has not been ratified by the United States); Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous 
Delinquent One: The United States’ International Human Rights Double Standard — 
Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y.C. L. REV. 59, 68 (2001) (“Opponents 
of human-rights treaty ratification have justified their position with a wide array of arguments 
that such instruments would: diminish fundamental American rights; violate states’ rights; 
promote world government; subject citizens to trial abroad; enhance Communist/Socialist 
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will threaten parental rights within the United States, insofar as the United 
States will be committed to advancing and protecting the rights of children in 
ways that might run counter to some parents’ preferences regarding things 
like education and discipline.75  Additionally, the regulation of family 
matters in the United States has traditionally been handled at the level of the 
individual U.S. states.76  However, these worries run counter to both the 
spirit and the drafting history of the Child Rights Convention.77  Perhaps 
most importantly for the purposes of this Note, none of the objections relate 
to Articles 21 and 35, discussed below, which are concerned with adoption 
and the human trafficking of children, respectively.78  
There are several key articles in the Child Rights Convention. First, 
Article 3 declares: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”79  Under Article 3, States parties assume the 
obligation to “ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her 
parents . . . and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures.”80  States parties also assume the obligation to 
“undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for 
the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention” 
within the means of those states.81  Article 9 is perhaps the most relevant to 
the issue of unregulated custody transfers, as it declares that states parties 
shall ensure that children will not be separated from their parents against 
their will except in circumstances where competent authorities that are 
subject to judicial review determine that the separation is necessary to protect 
the best interests of the child.82  
Article 18 shifts focus to a child’s parents and obligates States parties to 
make efforts to recognize the principle that parents “have common 
                                                                                                                   
influence; infringe upon domestic jurisdiction; increase international entanglements; and 
create self-executing obligations.”).   
 75 Kilbourne, supra note 72, at 58; id. at 97. 
 76 Id. at 57–58.  
 77 Id. at 61.  
 78 See generally id.  
 79 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.  It is important to note that the language 
references States and State actors, not private individuals.  
 80 Id. The importance of the “best interests of the child” standard will be explored more 
fully in Part II.E. 
 81 Id. art. 4. 
 82 Id. art. 9. 
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responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child.”83  This idea 
of parental obligation to the child is extended in Article 19, which requires 
States to take proactive measures to protect children from physical and 
mental abuse, from either violence or neglect.84 
Article 21 declares that adoption systems must protect the best interests of 
the children, and that those interests will be “paramount” in adoption 
proceedings.85  Article 27 states that children have a right to “a standard of 
living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development” and that parents are responsible for providing that living 
standard to the child, within the parents’ abilities and financial capacities.86  
Further, Article 27 commits states parties to assist parents in the 
implementation of that right so far as the state is capable.87  States parties 
also assume the obligation to prevent trafficking of children in “any purpose 
or in any form” under Article 35,88 though the exact nature of what 
constitutes trafficking is not specified within the Child Rights Convention.  
This lack of clarity was somewhat clarified with the enactment of the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, which will be discussed below.89  
The United Nations Children’s Fund—commonly known as UNICEF—
produced an Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (Handbook) in 2007 which further elaborates on the rights and 
obligations contained within the Convention.90  The Handbook suggests that 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Id. art. 18. 
 84 Id. art. 19. 
 85 Id. art. 21. 
 86 Id. art. 27.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. art. 35.  
 89 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol].  
Although there is an optional protocol to the Child Rights Convention that also mentions 
human trafficking, it only does so with respect to the trafficking for the purposes of the sale of 
children, child prostitution, and child pornography.  See Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 
Preamble, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].  This contains a 
narrower definition than is found in the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, and the language 
within the Optional Protocol suggests that the Optional Protocol is intended to focus on 
human trafficking within the context of sexual exploitation, rather than to define the outer 
boundaries of what constitutes human trafficking.  See id.  The Optional Protocol highlighting 
the international community’s growing concern with sexual tourism, sexual exploitation of 
children, and the growing availability of child pornography.    
 90 RACHEL HODGKIN & PETER NEWELL, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND, 
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 37 (3d ed. 
2007).  The original version of the Handbook was published in 1998.  Id. at XI.  
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states parties interpret what constitutes a child’s best interests in ways that are 
not overly culturally relative so as to deny to a child any of the rights contained 
within the Child Rights Convention.91  The Handbook also recommended that 
children be given independent representation of the child’s best interests 
whenever a legal decision related to the child is made.92  With respect to 
Article 9 of the Child Rights Convention, the Handbook states that: “The 
words ‘against their will’ refer either to the parents’ will or to the parents’ and 
child’s will together; the grammar makes clear that it does not mean the child’s 
will alone.”93  However, in instances in which the will of the child and the 
parents differs, the Handbook says that states should be willing to accept the 
role of arbiter between the parties.94  The Handbook goes on to say that, at a 
minimum, the state should establish judicial machinery by which the child can 
make a case for arbitration, particularly where the state is willing to step in to 
settle disputes between parents.95  Finally, the Handbook notes that a child 
may experience neglect when a child’s parents are either unable to care for the 
child’s needs, or intentionally do not care for the child’s needs, when 
discussing the demands of Article 19.96  
B.  The Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
The Child Rights Convention establishes many child rights that states 
should work to protect, but it generally sticks to open-textured language.  For 
example, with respect to adoption, the Child Rights Convention does not 
state with specificity how states should safeguard children; it lists the goals, 
but not the means.97  However, other instruments exist that create legal 
frameworks that can protect the best interests of children in specific areas.  
For adoption, the Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption98 was adopted in 1993 
with the aim of establishing an international framework that would ensure 
that children are protected during international adoptions.99  The Hague 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id. at 38.  
 92 Id. at 242.  
 93 Id. at 122.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 257.  
 97 See, e.g., Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 21.  
 98 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption art. I, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Hague Adoption Convention]. 
 99 Id. at Preamble.  
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Adoption Convention has ninety-eight contracting states, including the 
United States.100  
Trevor Buck has said that two goals of the Hague Adoption Convention 
are to help combat child trafficking and to reorient the international adoption 
system by placing primary emphasis on the best interests of the child, rather 
than on profit for those who were engaged in the international adoption 
process.101  Unlike the Child Rights Convention, the Hague Adoption 
Convention is not a human rights treaty, but rather a private law treaty.102  It 
does not establish human rights; instead, the Hague Adoption Convention 
builds upon the human rights framework established in the Child Rights 
Convention, as evidenced by the Hague Adoption Convention’s preamble.103  
The Hague Adoption Convention’s preamble states that the contracting states 
want “to establish common provisions” so as to protect the rights and best 
interests of a child who is the subject of intercountry adoption, “taking into 
account the principles set forth in international instruments, in particular the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child . . . .”104  
The objectives of the Hague Adoption Convention are enshrined in 
Article 1, which highlights two of the purposes of the Convention. One 
purpose is “to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best 
interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as 
recognised in international law.”105  Another purpose is “to establish a 
system of co-operation amongst Contracting states to ensure that those 
safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children.”106  
                                                                                                                   
 100 See Status Table 33: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=69 (last visited June 
12, 2017) (listing the current member states to the Hague Adoption Convention).  
 101 TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 247 (2d ed. 2011).  
 102 Private law concerns the relationships between individuals and institutions, while public 
law concerns the relationship between individuals and the State.  Id. at 67; Public law, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Thus, the Hague Adoption Convention 
establishes how private individuals will interact via a designated State entity throughout the 
international adoption process, whereas the Child Rights Convention and the Anti-trafficking 
Protocol establish how States will interact with individuals in light of substantive rights 
granted by those (and related) documents.   
 103 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble (stating that the Hague 
Adoption Convention “tak[es] into account the principles set forth in international 
instruments, in particular the [Child Rights Convention] . . .”).  
 104 Id.  
 105 Id. art. 1.  
 106 Id. (emphasis added).  
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The Hague Adoption Convention requires that each member state 
designate a “Central Authority.”107  That authority is responsible for ensuring 
that, among other things: 
i)  the child is adoptable; 
ii) after considering domestic options, international adoption 
will be in the child’s best interests; 
iii) those whose consent is required have been informed about 
the legal consequences of consent to adoption and have 
freely given consent; 
iv) the child has been informed of the consequences of 
adoption and has consented (where required), and the 
child’s wishes have been considered; 
v)  and that consent has not been induced via payment or any 
other form of compensation; and 
vi) the would-be adoptive parents are fit and eligible to adopt 
the child and have been counseled as is necessary.108 
The designation of a central authority is crucial, because it allows member 
states to trust one another throughout the intercountry adoption process, and 
J.H.A. van Loon, the former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, has commented that the mandated oversight by 
state authorities is the keystone of that trust.109  Finally, Article 29 of the 
Hague Adoption Convention limits the type of contact that prospective 
adoptive parents can have with birth parents,110 and Article 32 prohibits 
anyone from receiving “improper financial or other gain” from activities 
related to international adoption.111  
                                                                                                                   
 107 Id. art. 6. 
 108 Id. art. 4.  
 109 See David M. Smolin, Abduction, Sale and Traffic in Children in the Context of 
Intercountry Adoption, Information Document No. 1, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 8 (June, 2010), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/adop2010id01e.pdf 
(quoting Secretary J.H.A. van Loon, who spoke in 2007 when the United States deposited its 
ratification of the Hague Adoption Convention: “The Convention has created a global 
framework that provides stability by giving countries the control they need to trust their 
partners.”). 
 110 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, art. 29.  
 111 Id. art. 32.  
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C. The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children112 entered into force in 2003 and has been 
ratified by 172 states, including the United States.113  It acts as a supplement 
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.114  
The Preamble states that the Anti-trafficking Protocol was necessary given 
the lack of a comprehensive international framework with which to combat 
human trafficking, and because trafficking victims would not otherwise be 
adequately protected without such a protocol.115 
It is important to note that the definition of human trafficking116 under the 
Anti-trafficking Protocol is composed of three elements: activity, means, and 
purpose.117  “Activity” is comprised of the “recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of person.”118  “Means” includes the “threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person.”119  Finally, “purpose” involves “exploitation,” 
which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery and similar practices, servitude, or the removal of organs.120  
Understanding how each of these elements is interpreted is important when 
determining the applicability of the Anti-trafficking Protocol to the practice 
of unregulated custody transfers. Notably, Article 3(c) spells out an 
exception when children are involved.  To be precise, acts of “recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of 
exploitation” are considered trafficking even when the “means” listed in 
Article 3(a) are not present.121  
                                                                                                                   
 112 U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89.  
 113 UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, DEPOSITORY, STATUS OF TREATIES (Sept. 21, 
2017, 5:28 PM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en. 
 114 U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1, ¶ 1.  
 115 Id. at Preamble.  
 116 The U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol uses the phrase “trafficking in persons,” but this Note 
will proceed with the less unwieldy phrase “human trafficking.” 
 117 de Witte, supra note 68, at 50.  
 118 U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89, art. 3(a).  
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Id. art. 3(c).    
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D.  Customary International Law 
Outside of the instruments discussed above, there is an additional source 
of international obligations recognized by the United States—customary 
international law.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “customary international 
law” as “[i]nternational law that derives from the practice of states and is 
accepted by them as legally binding.”122  The definition contains two 
elements: an identifiable practice of states and the acceptance by those states 
of the practice as legally binding.  This is a subjective stance towards the 
practice, meaning that the practice must be viewed by the state as binding on 
its actions in the international community.  Customary international law 
stems from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation”123 as well as derivations from “general 
principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”124  Customary 
law originally required adherence over a substantial amount of time, but this 
requirement has diminished in importance since World War II, perhaps 
because improved communication made the practice of states widely and 
quickly known where there is broad acceptance and no or little objection.125  
Anthea Roberts has argued that the modern conception of customary 
international law is “deductive” in nature, insofar as it is derived from 
“general statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice.”126  
Such custom “can develop quickly because it is deducted from multilateral 
treaties and declarations by international fora such as the [U.N.] General 
Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize emerging 
customs, and generate new customs.”127  
The U.S. Constitution declares that “all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every [constituent] State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any [constituent] State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”128  U.S. federal courts have also acknowledged that 
customary international law is binding, provided that the United States has not 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Customary international law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
 123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. § 102(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
 124 Id. § 101(2)(c).  
 125 Id. at Reporter’s Notes (2).  
 126 Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001).   
 127 Id. 
 128 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (echoing the U.S. Constitution 
by stating that international law and agreements to which the United States is a party are the 
laws of that nation and “supreme over the law of the several [constituent] States”).  
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exempted itself from the relevant customary international law and there is no 
contradictory federal statute.129  Further, it has been argued that customary 
international law could be considered federal common law, based on U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions that have treated customary international law as 
binding on the United States, though this debate has not been settled.130  
The Child Rights Convention can be considered customary international 
law with respect to the United States based on apparent subjective 
acceptance of that Convention by the U.S. government.  For example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court referenced that Convention in a 2010 decision regarding 
the imposition of sentences involving life without parole on minors and 
highlighted that, although the Child Rights Convention was not binding on 
the Court, the “overwhelming weight of international opinion against life 
without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles provides 
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions . . . .”131 
Further, the  
[U.S. Supreme] Court has treated the laws and practices of 
other nations and international agreements as relevant to the 
                                                                                                                   
 129 See Oliva v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United 
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (reiterating that “[i]t has long been 
established that customary international law is part of the law of the United States to the 
limited extent that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations” and that 
“public international law is controlling only in the absence of controlling positive law or 
judicial precedent.” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and citing 
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part 
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of 
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects with which they treat.” (emphasis added)).  This judicial practice is not 
uncontroversial, however. For a discussion on the controversy surrounding declarations by 
U.S. federal courts holding customary international law to be binding on the United States, see 
CURTIS BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 147–56 (2d ed. 2015).  
 130 See BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 147–56, which traces the history of customary 
international law within American jurisprudence and highlights that, although conventional 
wisdom in the 1980s was that customary international law had the status of federal common 
law, this proposition has become more contentious in the intervening years.  This debate is 
important in large part because declaring customary international law to be federal common 
law could give it preemptory status when such federal common law conflicts with the laws of 
one of the constituent states of the United States. Id. at 149.  
 131 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Eighth Amendment not because those norms are binding or 
controlling but because the judgment of the world’s nations 
that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic 
principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale 
has respected reasoning to support it.132  
Instances where federal courts have declined to find enforceable obligations 
arising under the Child Rights Convention have generally involved 
contradictory federal law which, as described above, cannot be preempted by 
customary international law.133 
E.  The Best Interests of the Child in International Law 
One thread that runs through international law is the best interests of the 
child legal standard, which has been an important concept for decades.134  
This standard is understood to be a constantly evolving “dynamic concept” 
that “encompasses various issues” by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Children (Child Rights Committee).135  That body administers the Child 
Rights Convention, and it has issued a General Comment that explores the 
concept of the best interests standard within the context of Article 3 of the 
Child Rights Convention.136  
The Child Rights Committee has stated that the best interests standard 
involves examining and balancing the various factors and potential 
consequences of any decision pertaining to the welfare of a child in order to 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Id. at 82. 
 133 See, e.g., Oliva, 433 F.3d at 234 (noting that “Congress has enacted legislation defining the 
circumstances under which hardship to a child may appropriately be considered as a ground for 
granting relief . . . .  This statute, and not the [Child Rights Convention], necessarily determines 
the outcome. . . .”); Mejia v. Holder, 492 Fed. Appx. 780, 781 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child were customary international law, Congress may legislate 
beyond the limits imposed by international law.”); see also Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 
F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2006) (memorandum decision) (“Given that Martinez-Lopez is directly 
challenging a statute, he cannot appeal to customary international law.”).  
 134 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidelines on 
Determining the Best Interests of the Child (May 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf 
(listing seven instruments that incorporate the best interests standard, including, e.g., the 
Hague Adoption Convention, Child Rights Convention, and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child); see also Comm. on the Rights of the Children, General Comment 
No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary 
Consideration (Art. 3, ¶ 1), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (2013), at I(A)(2) [hereinafter General 
Comment on Art. 3].  
 135 General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at II(11). 
 136 Id.  
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ensure the child’s interests are effectively advanced.137  Explaining the nature 
of the best interests standard, the Child Rights Committee has stated that 
[i]t should be emphasized that the basic best interests assessment 
is a general assessment of all relevant elements of the child’s 
best interests, the weight of each element depending on the 
others . . . . In weighing the various elements, one needs to bear 
in mind that the purpose of assessing and determining the best 
interests of the child is to ensure the full and effective enjoyment 
of the rights recognized in the Convention and its Optional 
Protocols, and the holistic development of the child.138 
This standard is at the heart of the Child Rights Convention, which, as noted 
above, is binding on all U.N. member states except for the United States.  
The Child Rights Committee has noted that there is no “hierarchy of 
rights,” and that “no right could be compromised by a negative interpretation 
of the child’s best interests.”139  The child’s best interests should not only be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, or only when state decisions overtly 
affect the welfare of a single child; but even state actions, such as passing 
budget legislation, should incorporate the best interests of the child.140  
Further, the best interests of the child is to be understood as applying to both 
individual children, as well as children as a group,141 and it is applicable to 
decisions made in both the public and private spheres.142 
Despite the fact that the United States is not a state party to the Child 
Rights Convention, the best interests standard runs through the two Optional 
Protocols to the Child Rights Convention to which the United States is a state 
party.143  The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts states that its goal of 
raising the age of recruitment of children into armed forces “will contribute 
effectively to the implementation of the principle that the best interests of the 
                                                                                                                   
 137 See id. at V(A)(2).   
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at I(A).  
 140 Id. at IV(A)(2)(d).  
 141 Id. at IV(A)(1)(c).  
 142 Id. at I(A).  
 143 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the Commissioner, supra note 71 (select 
“Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown box at the top of the page); 
see also id. (select “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale 
of children, child prostitution and child pornography” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown 
box at the top of the page).  
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child are to be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.”144  
Similarly, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography specifies 
that the best interests of children “shall be a primary consideration” 
whenever victims of the specified illegal practices interact with a state 
party’s criminal justice system.145 Interpretations of these Protocols must 
reflect their complementary relationship to the Child Rights Convention and 
“must always be guided by the principles of non-discrimination, best 
interests of the child and child participation.”146  Given their complementary 
nature, the interpretation of the best interests standard within the Child 
Rights Convention can be read as informing and shaping the interpretation of 
the Optional Protocols to which the United States is a party.  The Hague 
Adoption Convention is also shaped by the understanding of the principles 
set forth in Child Rights Convention, as the Hague Adoption Convention 
explicitly states that it takes “into account the principles set forth in 
international instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. . . .”147  
To reiterate, Article 3 states that “in all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.”148  Additionally, Article 3 says that 
“States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being.”149  The Child Rights Committee has 
interpreted the concept of the best interests standard laid out in Article 3 as a 
threefold concept: a substantive right, an interpretive principle, and a rule of 
procedure.150  As a substantive right, the child has a right to have his or her 
interests taken as a primary consideration.151  As an interpretive principle, in 
the event that a legal provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the 
interpretation that best serves the child’s interests should be chosen.152  
Finally, as a rule of procedure, decision-making processes established by a 
                                                                                                                   
 144 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflicts, Preamble, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 236. 
 145 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 8(3), May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 247.  
 146 United Nations Children’s Fund, Advancing the CRC, https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_ 
protocols.html (last visited June 13, 2017).   
 147 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.  
 148 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3(1).  
 149 Id. art. 3(2).  
 150 General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at I(A)(6).  
 151 Id. at I(A)(6)(a).  
 152 Id. at I(A)(6)(b).  
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state party must include procedural guarantees any time evaluations of the 
child’s best interests are made.153  Looked at as a whole, the Child Rights 
Committee’s comment on Article 3 displays an understanding of the best 
interests standard that is broad, pervasive, and holistic in its approach to 
advancing the best interests of children whenever decisions impacting the 
welfare of children must be made.  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Part will explore whether the United States is currently obligated to 
take proactive measures to combat the practice of unregulated custody 
transfers.  The analysis will begin with the more general best interests 
standard, then move on to instruments pertaining to illegal adoption and 
human trafficking.  The reason behind starting with the more general best 
interests standard is simple: it is a cornerstone of international human rights 
law, as indicated by its place therein for the last half-century, as well as its 
prominence within the Child Rights Convention.154  However, the best 
interests standard’s broad scope and less-than-concrete nature, coupled with 
the United States’ tenuous relationship with the Child Rights Convention, 
makes that standard an ineffective means of motivating the United States to 
proactively combat unregulated custody transfers.  In light of this, this Part 
will examine those transfers in relation to the analogous practices of illegal 
adoption and human trafficking.  Part IV will assert that expanding the 
understanding of either of those unlawful practices, such that they encompass 
unregulated custody transfers, is the most effective way of instigating change 
within the United States at the national level in light of that country’s 
existing international obligations. 
                                                                                                                   
 153 Id. at I(A)(6)(c).  To elaborate,  
States must put into place formal processes, with strict procedural safeguards, 
designed to assess and determine the child’s best interests for decisions 
affecting the child, including mechanisms for evaluating the results.  States 
must develop transparent and objective processes for all decisions made by 
legislators, judges or administrative authorities, especially in areas which 
directly affect the child or children. 
Id. at V(B).  
 154 The best interests standard has been a part of the development of international human rights 
for decades; it was included in the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.  Id. at I(A).  
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A.  The United States is not Necessarily Obligated to Combat Unregulated 
Custody Transfers Under the Best Interests Standard 
The United States is likely bound to the best interests standard contained 
within the Child Rights Convention by its numerous international 
commitments.  Such commitments include self-imposed commitments as a 
state party to two Optional Protocols to the Child Rights Convention, the 
interpretation of which are influenced by the principles laid out in that 
Convention.155  Similarly, the United States is a state party to the Hague 
Adoption Convention, which explicitly ties itself to the principles contained 
within the Child Rights Convention.156  Going further, the near universal 
adoption of the Child Rights Convention, as well as the long-standing place 
of the best interests standard within international law, strongly suggests that 
the standard has achieved the status of customary international law, as 
discussed supra in Part III.D.  That the United States has voluntary 
committed itself to instruments that themselves incorporate the best interests 
standard is evidence that the United States has adopted the subjective stance 
required for a practice to obtain the status of customary international law.157 
This means that the United States is arguably bound to adhere to the 
requirements under the Child Rights Convention.  
Unfortunately, even if one were to assume that the United States is bound 
to consider the child’s best interests based on its existing treaty obligations 
and/or customary international law, it is unclear what such a commitment 
would actually entail.  Although the Child Rights Committee’s comments on 
Article 3 of the Child Rights Convention indicates that the best interests 
standard is to be understood as a robust right that should be a foundational 
consideration in all decisions affecting the well-being of children, the 
language of Article 3 hints at limitations on that best interests standard.  John 
Quigley has pointed out that “the exercise by a child of a right is subject to 
the guidance of the child’s parents.  In this respect, the Convention would 
seem to protect a child’s right less fully than human rights treaties of general 
application, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”158  
                                                                                                                   
 155 See UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Optional Protocol on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Nov. 30, 2005), https://www.unicef.org/ 
crc/index_30204.html (explaining that because the “Optional Protocol on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography” is “a complement to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, interpretation of the Optional Protocol’s text must always be guided by the 
principles of non-discrimination, best interests of the child and child participation.”).  
 156 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.  
 157 See Part II.D, supra.  
 158 John Quigley, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (2003).  Professor Quigley is the President’s Club 
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Similarly, Quigley highlights that “Article 3 requires ratifying states to make 
a child’s best interests ‘a primary consideration’. . . .  The word ‘a’ here was 
substituted for ‘the’ from earlier drafts to make clear that a child’s best 
interest is not the overriding and only consideration.”159  The United States 
itself objected to earlier drafts of Article 3 of the Child Rights Convention 
that used “the paramount consideration,” rather than “a primary 
consideration,” and the latter formulation was adopted as a compromise.160  
The United States’ objection to the language contained within earlier 
drafts of Article 3 indicates an unwillingness to elevate the best interests of 
the child above all other considerations.  This unwillingness is not 
unfounded, as a member of the Child Rights Convention Working Group 
noted at a 1981 meeting that “other parties might have equal or even superior 
legal interests in some cases (e.g., medical emergencies during childbirth).161  
Unfortunately, by forcing the child’s best interests to be weighed against the 
rights and interests of others, it becomes more difficult to determine when a 
child’s interests should prevail over another person’s competing interests.  
Per the interpretation of the best interests standard by the Child Rights 
Committee, so long as the interests of the child are properly weighed, 
nothing requires that the child’s interests ultimately win out over opposing 
considerations.  In the setting of an unregulated custody transfer, the interests 
of family privacy and parental privilege with respect to the custody and 
control of their children must be weighed against the child’s best interests, 
and it is not clear how the tension arising from these competing interests is 
best addressed.  
The incidents described in Part I highlight the potential dangers to which 
children involved in an unregulated custody transfer may be exposed, 
dangers that plainly are not in any child’s best interests.  As noted above, the 
best interests standard must be applied on a case-by-case basis, and there is 
no definitive list of factors that must be considered.  Indeed, the Child Rights 
Committee stated, “[it] considers it useful to draw up a non-exhaustive and 
non-hierarchical list of elements that could be included in a best interests 
assessment by any decision-maker having to determine a child’s best 
interests.”162  Such a list would provide guidance but would not necessarily 
                                                                                                                   
Professor of Law at Ohio State University and an expert in international law.  See Faculty 
Directory, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. MORITZ COL. OF L., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/profes 
sor/john-b-quigley/ (last visited June 13, 2017).   
 159 Quigley, supra note 158, at 405.  
 160 Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 175 
(1998). 
 161 Id. at 175.  
 162 General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at V(A).  
212  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:185 
 
dictate a specific course of action in a particular situation wherein a child’s 
best interests must be determined.  Although unregulated custody transfers 
are not in the best interests of adopted children, it is unclear what must be 
done to combat the practice by the United States at the national level.  Since 
the United States has traditionally left regulation of family matters to its 
constituent states, it could simply opt to leave the regulation of those custody 
transfers to those states.  Regrettably, that approach has led to the untenable 
situation described in Part II with relatively few U.S. states addressing 
unregulated custody transfers via legislation, and widely varying legislation 
in those U.S. states that have legislated against the practice in some way.   
Since Article 21 of the Child Rights Convention states that the best 
interests of the child becomes “the paramount consideration” when making 
decisions regarding adoption, it could be argued that unregulated custody 
transfers of adopted children are substantively different from transfers 
involving non-adopted children.163  However, it is uncertain whether Article 
21’s language would apply after an adoption has been completed, since 
adoption decisions would have already been made and (in theory) completed 
prior to any unregulated custody transfer.  Even if one assumed that Article 21 
would extend to decisions concerning an adopted child after the finalization of 
an adoption, the United States is not bound by the terms of the Child Rights 
Convention. Even if the Child Rights Committee’s interpretation of the best 
interests standard within the context of Article 3 is taken as indicative of the 
current scope of that standard as a matter of customary international law, that 
interpretation does not elevate the best interests of the child to the level of “the 
paramount consideration.”  Since the Optional Protocols to which the United 
States is a party do not cite the “paramount consideration” standard, and the 
evidence suggests that customary international law encompasses only “a 
primary consideration” standard, it would be difficult to argue that the United 
States is explicitly obligated to take special action when adopted children are 
involved.  Bolstering that conclusion is the fact that the instrument pertaining 
to adoption to which the United States is a party—the Hague Adoption 
Convention—does not use the phrase “paramount consideration,” but rather 
states that one of its objectives is “to establish safeguards to ensure that 
intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child. . . .”164  It 
would be difficult to argue—given this language and the United States’ failure 
to ratify the Child Rights Convention—that the United States considers itself 
bound to make the child’s best interests anything more than a primary 
consideration when decisions impacting the child’s welfare are made.  
                                                                                                                   
 163 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 21.  
 164 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, art. 1(a).  
2017] UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS 213 
 
Although it seems clear that the United States is bound to make the best 
interests of children a primary consideration when decisions affecting the 
well-being of children are made, what that fact entails is undetermined.  The 
nature of the best interests standard makes it difficult to say it requires any 
particular course of action in a given case; so long as the child’s best 
interests are a primary consideration, a state may determine that other 
considerations are more important.  In the case of the United States, the 
traditional role its constituent states have played in regulating family life, as 
well as the competing rights and interests of a child’s parents, may make it 
unattractive to attack the problem of unregulated custody transfers at the 
national level.  
However, even if the United States is not necessarily bound by the best 
interests standard to take proactive measures against unregulated custody 
transfers, either due to its treaty obligations or as a matter of customary 
international law, it may be possible to demonstrate that the United States is 
bound by other instruments to combat the practice.  To that end, the next two 
sections will explore whether unregulated custody transfers constitute a form 
of either illegal adoption, human trafficking, or both, and whether the United 
States is thereby obligated to combat those custody transfers. 
B.  Unregulated Custody Transfers do not Constitute Illegal Adoption Under 
International Law 
There are three ways that an adoption can be illegal, thereby undermining 
or destroying the legal legitimacy of that adoption.  The first is where parents 
have bypassed the official system and directly procured a child in a foreign 
country, then subsequently pretend that the child is theirs.165  Another similar 
situation arises where the would-be parents who have bypassed the official 
adoption system attempt to legitimize the adoption at a later date.166  Finally, 
there are cases where “parents” go through the official adoption process in 
good faith, but where there are fraudulent elements within the adoption 
process, such as falsified documents, abduction of the child prior to adoption, 
or coercion of the birth family to give up the child for adoption.167 
Of the three scenarios listed above, the first most closely resembles an 
unregulated custody transfer because of the intentional circumvention of 
existing procedures for obtaining permanent custody of a child.168  
                                                                                                                   
 165 de Witte, supra note 68, at 22–23.  
 166 Id. at 23.  
 167 Id. 
 168 It is important to distinguish short-term transfers of custody via a legal mechanism such 
as power of attorney from long-term transfers using the same mechanism.  Power of attorney 
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By bypassing the official safeguards spelled out at the national level and 
under the terms of the Hague Adoption Convention, would-be adoptive 
parents prevent states from ensuring that adoption proceedings “are made in 
the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental 
rights,”169 while simultaneously ensuring that birth parents are not being 
exploited or coerced.170  Unregulated custody transfers bypass these same 
safeguards with respect to the interests of the child, though it seems less 
likely that parents are going to be exploited or coerced in these situations.  
This failure to ensure that the best interests of the child are protected is in 
contravention of Article 1 of the Hague Adoption Convention171 and Article 
3 of the Child Rights Convention.172  Although Article 3 is binding on states 
and state actors, not private individuals, the Convention does establish that 
states have a responsibility for protecting the rights of children and taking 
measures to ensure those rights are not infringed upon.  It is difficult to see 
why a state’s interest in protecting the rights of children within its 
jurisdiction extends only to official acts; presumably, a state has an ongoing 
interest in the continued protection and promotion of the rights of children 
under its administrative purview.  As such, it seems appropriate to consider 
the best interests of a child within an unregulated custody transfer insofar as 
the private actors involved in such a transfer are undermining the state’s 
ability to live up to its commitments under the Child Rights Convention. 
An argument can also be made that adoptive parents involved in an 
unregulated custody transfer are similar to the birth parents in scenario three, 
wherein coercion may have played a part in a birth parent’s decision to give 
up their child for adoption.  Many of the stories that first brought the practice 
into the public consciousness involved parents who were desperate for 
assistance and without sufficient support or options to properly deal with the 
various behavioral, emotional, or psychological needs of adopted children.173  
The availability of an unregulated custody transfer may have a coercive 
effect on adoptive parents that would run counter to the intentions of the 
Hague Adoption Convention.  That Convention explicitly takes into account 
                                                                                                                   
is useful for temporary transfers so that the temporary custodian can make important legal 
decisions regarding a child given into their custody.  If, for example, a parent wishes to give a 
family friend the authority to make medical decisions while the child is left in the friend’s care 
while the parent is out of the country, then power of attorney is an appropriate and useful tool.  
 169 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.  
 170 Id. art. 4. 
 171 Id. art. 1.  
 172 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.  
 173 See, e.g., Meghan Twohey, The Child Exchange: Inside America’s Underground Market 
for Adopted Children, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/adopti 
on/#article/part3.  
2017] UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS 215 
 
the desire to avoid exploitation or coercion of birth parents, just as poverty 
may be a coercive force in some of the poorer countries that traditionally 
supply the children involved in intercountry adoptions.  
Unregulated custody transfers are also comparable to illegal adoption, 
because both involve active marketplaces wherein the children are obtained 
by would-be parents.  These markets have a very high demand relative to the 
available supply of adoptable children; UNICEF has estimated that the ratio 
of prospective parents to adoptable children was as high as fifty to one.174  
This imbalance increases the likelihood that people will resort to means 
outside of the official systems to obtain a child.175  
It is important to note that illegal adoption usually involves the payment 
of fees and other associated expenses, thereby bringing into the picture those 
who would exploit this imbalance for their own financial gain.176  No such 
profit-focused motivation appears to be driving the phenomenon of 
unregulated custody transfers.  However, that does not mean that there 
cannot be an exchange of non-monetary consideration in such transfers, since 
one person is getting a child through the exchange, thereby avoiding—
intentionally or not—the inherent costs associated with official adoption 
processes.  On the other side of the exchange, the biological parents are 
unburdening themselves of a child they are either unwilling or unable to care 
for.  Thus, while profit might not be motivating the exchanges, unregulated 
custody transfers still involve the same kind of supply and demand factors 
that can drive a market in the unregulated transfer of custody of children. 
If unregulated custody transfers are considered a form of illegal adoption, 
there is still the question of how states are obligated to act.  As discussed 
supra in Part III.B, the Hague Adoption Convention was designed to avoid 
illegal adoptions by establishing state oversight and regulation of the 
adoption process so as to protect the parties involved.  It does not, however, 
have civil or criminal penalties built into it.  The Child Rights Convention is 
also not a criminal law instrument, but rather a binding treaty in which states 
have assumed certain obligations to recognize and protect specified rights. 
Illegal adoption is not specifically mentioned within that Convention, and 
Article 21 obliges states parties to make efforts to ensure the propriety of the 
adoption process via separate bilateral or multilateral agreements, but the 
Convention does not provide for or require states to enact civil or criminal 
penalties with respect to illegal adoption.177  
                                                                                                                   
 174 de Witte, supra note 68, at 25–26. 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 28.  
 177 Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 21.  
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C.  The United States is not Bound by the Child Rights Convention as a 
Matter of Customary International Law 
Even if the Child Rights Convention could obligate states parties to enact 
measures to protect adopted children from unregulated custody transfers, the 
United States would not be bound because it has only signed, but not ratified, 
the Child Rights Conventions.  As noted in Part III.D, there is an argument to 
be made that, although not bound as a state party, the United States is 
nonetheless bound by the Child Rights Convention as a matter of customary 
international law.  Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that 
customary international law can be determinative so long as there are not 
positive laws, executive actions, or court decisions that contradict the alleged 
customary international law.178  With respect to unregulated custody 
transfers, the U.S. Congress has not passed legislation on the topic, nor has 
there been executive action or a federal court decision regarding the practice. 
Currently, the cited provisions of the Child Rights Convention do not 
conflict with standing U.S. law.  The U.S. Supreme Court and several of the 
U.S. federal circuit courts have favorably cited the Convention, which could 
indicate that the United States subjectively considers itself bound to the 
Child Rights Convention, at least in part.  Unfortunately, given the small 
number of federal cases that favorably cite the Child Rights Convention, as 
well as the United States’ failure to even submit that Convention to its Senate 
for ratification, it seems unlikely that the United States has adopted the 
subjective stance required for customary international law to be binding on a 
state, particularly when coupled with the United States’ general wariness of 
international treaties.179   
Ultimately, unregulated custody transfers could be reasonably construed 
as a form of illegal adoption, thereby triggering provisions of the Child 
Rights Convention and the Hague Adoption Convention.  Unfortunately, 
even if such transfers amount to illegal adoption, neither convention offers 
much in the way of guidance as to what should be done to combat the 
practice.  As such, it may be better to consider whether unregulated custody 
transfers and illegal adoption can be considered a form of human trafficking.  
                                                                                                                   
 178 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 179 Middleton, supra note 74, at 66. 
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D.  Unregulated Custody Transfers do not Qualify as Human Trafficking 
Under International Law 
The Child Rights Convention, U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, and the 
Hague Adoption Convention do not speak to or define illegal adoption. 
Given the loose connection between illegal adoption and human trafficking 
within the international instruments discussed supra, the following analysis 
will proceed solely on the merits of unregulated custody transfers, without 
reference to illegal adoption.  
As discussed in Part III, the three elements in the U.N. Anti-trafficking 
Protocol are “activity,” “means,” and “purpose,” but only “activity” and 
“purpose” need be discussed here, because the Protocol drops the 
requirement to satisfy the “means” element when children are involved.180  
Therefore, a child will be considered to have been a victim of human 
trafficking provided that they are recruited, transported, transferred, 
harbored, or received for the purposes of exploitation.181  Given that the 
transfer and receipt of children are an inherent part of the practice of 
unregulated custody challenges, whether or not such transfers constitute 
human trafficking will turn on whether the children involved are being 
exploited within the meaning of the instruments.  
Discussing exploitation, the Anti-trafficking Protocol states that 
“exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”182  
None of the listed activities bear directly on the practice of unregulated 
custody transfers, but the list was not intended to be exhaustive, as indicated 
by the phrase “exploitation shall include, at a minimum” found within the 
definition.  The question then becomes whether unregulated custody 
transfers are so closely analogous to the prohibited purposes as to justify its 
inclusion under the “at a minimum” phrase.  
Each of the prohibited purposes shares something in common with 
unregulated custody transfers: they all commodify a child, insofar as the 
child is effectively turned into a good that is introduced into a market to 
fulfill a particular need.  These activities place no emphasis on the best 
interests of the child, but are instead oriented to satisfy the parties who are in 
control of the child.  Seen in this light, analogizing unregulated custody 
transfers (and, for that matter, illegal adoptions) as a form of human 
                                                                                                                   
 180 U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89, art. 3(c).  
 181 Id. art. 3. 
 182 Id. art. 3(a).  
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trafficking is not particularly difficult. Adoptive parents need a way by 
which they can divest themselves of custody of their adopted child and find 
their way into a forum, such as an online messaging board, where they can 
advertise their child to potentially interested parties.  Other people, seeking 
to avoid the formal adoption process—perhaps because they would fail to 
qualify for adoption through official channels, or because they wish to avoid 
the costs associated with the official process—arrange to take the child from 
the adoptive parents and, with a simply drafted power of attorney, the 
permanent transfer of custody of the child is effectuated.  The child is handed 
off, without oversight by a neutral third-party, regardless of the trauma and 
distress caused by the entire process.  This scenario is driven by the needs 
and desires of the adults, not the child, and as such the transfer of that child 
is much like the transfer of any good during a business transaction.  The only 
real difference is the lack of a monetary exchange, but, given the benefits 
obtained by the adult parties through the custody transfer, the child has been 
nonetheless commodified.183  
It might be argued that this exchange is like that which takes place 
through the formal adoption process—a process that is allowed and 
promoted throughout the world—and therefore the description of 
unregulated custody transfers as a form of exploitation must be fatally 
flawed.  There are two problems with this argument, however.  First, both 
illegal adoption and unregulated custody transfers can be seen as a response 
to the huge demand by prospective parents and the much smaller supply of 
adoptable children, and the potential monetary gains for those who facilitate 
such adoptions.  So long as there are would-be parents who desire children, 
the adoption process may be corrupted to fulfill those desires at the expense 
of the children (and the birth parents of those children).184  These improper 
incentives set those illegal practices apart from legitimate adoptions, because 
profit is not a consideration and a conflict of interests between those 
facilitating the adoption and the best interests of the child (and the child’s 
birth family) is avoided.   
Second, there is a key difference between unregulated custody transfers 
and adoptions. In any adoption governed by the Hague Adoption 
Convention, the state intervenes as a third-party whose stated primary goal is 
to promote the best interests of the child, thereby helping to mitigate 
concerns that intercountry adoption can promote exploitative practices. 
While adoptions performed in accordance with the Hague Adoption 
Convention and in line with the mandates of the Child Rights Convention are 
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by no means incorruptible, the presence of the sending and receiving states 
acts as a potentially powerful way of protecting children from being 
commodified and exploited for the sake of prospective parents and self-
interested adoption facilitators. 
As has been shown, it can be argued that unregulated custody transfers 
constitute human trafficking under the “at a minimum” phrase within the 
U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol.  Since the United States has ratified the U.N. 
Anti-trafficking Protocol, it could be argued that the United States is bound 
to take proactive measures to combat the practice of unregulated custody 
transfers per the terms of those instruments.  The U.N. Anti-trafficking 
Protocol is of particular importance as a supplement to the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, because that Protocol it 
is an international instrument that requires states to criminalize human 
trafficking (as defined within the Anti-trafficking Protocol).  Most 
importantly, the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol commits states parties to a 
proactive approach to combating human trafficking.185 
Despite the foregoing arguments, it remains unclear whether unregulated 
custody transfers would be considered a form of human trafficking.  The 
issue has not yet entered into international discourse, and it is uncertain if it 
will ever do so, given the inherently underground nature of the practice.  
Further, since illegal adoption—a related but more well-known and visible 
phenomenon—has not been explicitly acknowledged as a form of human 
trafficking absent subsequent exploitation, it seems unlikely that unregulated 
custody transfers would be considered to have satisfied the constitutive 
elements of human trafficking.    
E.  Recommendations 
As has been demonstrated, the current state of both U.S. domestic law 
and international law are ill-equipped to combat the problem of unregulated 
custody transfers.  The United States suffers from a lack of a cohesive 
national strategy, and any measures taken to combat the practice have been 
done at the level of the constituent states of the United States.  Additionally, 
the international community’s current understandings of both “illegal 
adoption” and “human trafficking” do not seem broad enough to encompass 
unregulated custody transfers.  The difficulties inherent in tackling the 
problem through a constituent state-by-state approach, as evidenced by the 
sporadic, uneven, and often inadequate legislative responses at the level of 
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the constituent states of the United States, suggests that a top-down approach 
would be more effective.  
Since the United States is the largest receiving country for intercountry 
adoptions, focusing on the United States is an effective way to target the 
practice of unregulated custody transfers, thereby protecting the single 
largest population of internationally adopted children.  As argued above, this 
could be achieved most immediately by defining unregulated custody 
transfers as either illegal adoption, human trafficking, or both, within the 
context of the Child Rights Convention.  The Child Rights Convention 
would be an effective mechanism for achieving a widespread impact for 
several reasons: 
1.  The Child Rights Convention informs the definitions of 
human trafficking and/or illegal adoption within the U.N. 
Anti-trafficking Protocol186 and the Hague Adoption 
Convention;187 
2.  The Child Rights Convention can be viewed as customary 
international law that is binding on the United States with 
respect to unregulated custody transfers, given the 
country’s current commitments to combating human 
trafficking and illegal adoption as evidenced by the fact 
that it is a member of both the U.N. Anti-trafficking 
Protocol and the Hague Adoption Convention; and 
3.  The Child Rights Convention acknowledges that children 
are particularly vulnerable188 and countries should 
proactively work to secure the fundamental rights of 
children.189 
If the trend towards a broader understanding of what constitutes illegal 
adoption and/or human trafficking continues, it is not a stretch to say that 
unregulated custody transfers should and will be considered a practice that 
states should take proactive measures to combat.  That being said, there is 
still the question as to the best way to address the problem.    
It is important to acknowledge that parents experiencing problems with 
adopted children may honestly be looking for a way out that can preserve 
both the best interests of the child and the parents, even if one must 
simultaneously recognize that some adoptive parents may opt for an 
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unregulated custody transfer for less altruistic reasons.  Adopted children 
have often suffered some form of trauma during their formative years and 
this is especially true as the age of a child increases.190  This increases the 
likelihood that they will experience developmental, physical, mental, 
emotional, or behavioral issues,191  Unfortunately, it is common for adoptive 
parents to have the child’s entire history of trauma hidden from them during 
the adoption process.192  Similarly, parents in the United States often have 
few options once the adoption is finalized, and they cannot simply divest 
themselves of their parental responsibilities, without risking charges of child 
abandonment or child endangerment, depending on the jurisdiction.193  Only 
twenty U.S. states allow internationally adopted children to participate in 
their post-adoption programs, per the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, leaving many parents without the resources they need to help their 
child and themselves.194  Parents are left unsupported by the system that 
facilitated the adoption in the first place, and without a legitimate means of 
divesting themselves of parental responsibility when faced with the needs 
their child has but which they are unable or unwilling to accommodate.  
Considering these realities, there are three ways of approaching the 
problem: prevention, intervention, and punishment.  Of the three, prevention 
and intervention would offer the greatest chance for success, since the 
underground nature of unregulated custody transfers makes enforcement of 
available penalties difficult.  It is unclear whether relatively weak 
punishments would deter desperate parents.  Further, enforcement steps 
would be implemented too late in the child’s life, as they have already been 
abandoned by their parents and exposed to potential abuse by the child’s new 
custodians, in addition to the trauma inherent to the custody transfer.  
Some U.S. jurisdictions have focused on intervention, rather than 
punishment.  For example, the state of Ohio has proposed legislation that is 
unique within the United States.195  In situations where a non-parent has 
presented a power of attorney to a mandatory reporter to make custodial 
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decisions for a child, that mandatory reporter196 must inform the public 
services agency within the county wherein that child resides.197  This could 
dramatically increase the likelihood that an unregulated custody transfer 
would come to the attention of the relevant child welfare agencies, giving 
those agencies the opportunity to intervene and protect the best interests of 
the child.  Given that “best interests” guide child welfare law both in the 
United States and around the world, the Ohio model should be considered 
elsewhere as a potentially effective way to bring unregulated custody 
transfers out of the darkness.  
Although laws have been passed in some U.S. states focusing on 
prohibiting the practice of unregulated custody transfers and creating criminal 
penalties for those who engage in the practice, those laws fail to include 
preventative strategies centered around post-adoption services.  However, 
increasing the availability of these services should be explored as a way to 
prevent unregulated custody transfers from occurring in the first place.  
Looking for a specific model on which to base a post-adoptive services 
program is difficult, however, since the current situation within the United 
States has been described by Evan Donaldson as “[a] checkered landscape of 
programs, intervention models, therapies developed by adoption experts who 
provide training across the nation and have authored books, and innovative 
new approaches that seem promising but are much less well-known or 
empirically tested.”198  Of those jurisdictions within the United States that do 
offer services, none are comprehensive enough to encompass the plethora of 
needs adoptive families have.199  A focused effort to examine the needs of 
adoptive families is necessary to best serve them, thereby alleviating the 
pressures that lead to unregulated custody transfers.  While the exact services 
that should be provided are beyond the scope of this Note, it is imperative that 
commitments are made to provide those essential services.200  
Before concluding, it should be noted that non-adoptive families are often 
faced with similar pressures and challenges.  Nothing about unregulated 
custody transfers is specific to children adopted internationally or 
domestically, even if it happens to be true that children who are adopted 
internationally might be more likely to experience the types of trauma that 
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would lead to behavioral problems that may disrupt family life.201  While 
some U.S. states have targeted unregulated custody transfers only with 
respect to adopted children,202 others have not made the distinction.203  This 
inclusive approach should be followed, as the best interests of all children 
are at the heart of child welfare systems throughout the world, as dictated 
within the Child Rights Convention, the Hague Adoption Convention, and 
numerous other human rights instruments.  A struggling family can need 
support regardless of how that family was formed.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Unregulated custody transfers expose internationally adopted children to 
potentially significant harm, but the existing legal tools within the 
international community are currently insufficient to help combat the 
practice.  The definitions of the two most closely-related practices—illegal 
adoption and human trafficking—do not appear to encompass these transfers, 
and the best interests standard is too indefinite to require states to take 
proactive measures against unregulated custody transfers.  Similarly, the 
legal landscape within the United States demonstrates the difficulties 
associated with a addressing the issue using a state-by-state approach. 
Expanding the current definitions of human trafficking and illegal adoption 
under international legal instruments like the Child Rights Convention and 
the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol such that they encompass these custody 
transfers could be an effective to motivate countries around the world to 
proactively address the issue.  States parties would be bound to take 
measures to combat the practice, and even states that are not currently a party 
to those instruments could arguably be bound as a matter of customary 
international law.  The world has recognized that children are especially 
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.  Battling unregulated custody transfers 
by mandating state intervention ensures that the best interests of adopted 
children can be more readily guaranteed and that unnecessary harms to those 
children can be avoided. 
                                                                                                                   
 201 Id. at 16.  
 202 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-211(b) (Westlaw through the 2016 legislative sessions). 
 203  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-10-05 (Westlaw through chapter 484 (end) of the 
2015 Regular Session). 
